Reading Time: 4 minutes

The controversy surrounding the reappointment of Dr. Carla Barnett as CARICOM Secretary‑General raises fundamental questions of law, treaty compliance, and institutional legitimacy.

 At its core, this is not merely a political disagreement, but a legal and governance concern. As a rules‑based regional organisation, CARICOM derives its authority not from expediency or convenience, but from fidelity to its founding instrument: the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. Where that instrument is not strictly observed, the legitimacy of outcomes, however well‑intentioned, is inevitably compromised.

The Treaty is clear on a critical point: the Secretary‑General is appointed by the Conference of Heads of Government. Article 31 establishes the office, while Article 24 vests the Conference with authority over institutional leadership. Nowhere does the Treaty distinguish between an initial appointment and any subsequent term. It does not recognise “reappointment” as a legally distinct act. In treaty interpretation, such silence is decisive. Where a treaty employs a single legal term without qualification, that term must be applied uniformly. Any assumption of office, whether for a first or second term, is therefore an appointment and must satisfy the same procedural requirements.

Those requirements are mandatory, not discretionary. Article 27 establishes consensus as the default decision‑making mechanism of the Conference, except where the Treaty expressly provides otherwise. No such exception exists for the appointment of the Secretary‑General. Article 31 itself is silent on any voting mechanism beyond what Article 27 prescribes.

Against that legal backdrop, the statement by CARICOM Chairman and Prime Minister of St. Kitts and Nevis, Dr. Terrance Drew, that the reappointment of Dr. Barnett had achieved the “required majority” is problematic. The Treaty neither defines nor authorises majority voting for this purpose. A majority, however large, cannot lawfully substitute for consensus in a consensus‑based organisation.

Consensus is not rhetorical; it is a legal standard. In institutional law, consensus requires the absence of objection by any Member State entitled to participate in the decision. Once a Member State formally objects, consensus collapses as a matter of law. That is the central difficulty confronting CARICOM. Trinidad and Tobago’s expressed opposition to the reappointment places the legality of the process in jeopardy. That single objection is sufficient to undermine consensus and, by extension, the validity of the appointment.

The issue is further compounded by unresolved concerns regarding participation under Article 24, which conceives the Conference as a collective body comprising all Heads of Government or their duly authorised representatives. The lawful exercise of Conference powers depends on the meaningful inclusion of its members. Where states are excluded from deliberations, not invited to meetings, or denied the opportunity to participate through accredited representatives, decisions taken in those circumstances risk being ultra vires-beyond the authority conferred by the Treaty.

The Treaty does not empower informal caucuses, restricted retreats, or subsets of Member States to exercise Conference authority in a manner that disenfranchises others.

Equally troubling are concerns surrounding procedural irregularity and transparency. While the Treaty does not explicitly regulate agendas or communiqués, orderly procedure is implicit in Articles 24 and 26, which govern the functioning of the Conference. The appointment of a Secretary‑General is among the most consequential decisions the Conference can make. Such a decision would ordinarily appear on the provisional agenda, be debated in plenary, and be formally recorded in the official communiqué. None of these elements appears to have occurred. This is not a trivial omission. It strikes at the integrity of CARICOM’s decision‑making architecture and undermines confidence in its processes.

Some may argue that judicial review by the Caribbean Court of Justice would be required to unsettle the appointment and that, absent such review, the decision remains legally operative. Even if that narrow argument is accepted, it misses the larger institutional point that CARICOM is not a supranational authority wielding coercive power. It functions through legitimacy, mutual confidence, and voluntary compliance among sovereign states.

A Secretary‑General whose appointment is clouded by contested consensus, procedural opacity, and unresolved treaty concerns inevitably faces an authority deficit. That deficit limits the office holder’s capacity to act as an impartial guardian of the Treaty, to mediate sensitive regional issues, and to command the confidence of all Member States. This is not an indictment of any individual. Former CARICOM officials have long observed that in small‑state regionalism, authority is conferred through consensus, reinforced through process, and sustained through credibility. When a process is compromised, credibility erodes regardless of experience or good faith. In such circumstances, the weakness attaches not merely to the officeholder, but to the office itself.

At a moment when CARICOM faces profound economic, geopolitical, and climate challenges, adherence to its own rules is indispensable. Treaty compliance is not a technicality; it is the foundation of legitimacy. Transparent governance is not a luxury; it is a necessity.

Until the procedural defects surrounding the appointment of the Secretary‑General are addressed openly, consensually, and in strict conformity with the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, the position remains institutionally untenable. Legitimacy is not assumed; it is earned through scrupulous respect for law, process, and collective consent. CARICOM can, and must, do better.

---

Clinton Rattray is a graduate of the UWI with a Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations and a MSc candidate, Governance and Public Policy at Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social & Economic Studies (SALISES).